Book Reviews by Swire, Peter & Schwartz, Paul M
BOOK REVIEWS
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS. By Jerry L. Mashaw. New Haven.- Yale University Press,
1983. Pp. x, 238.
Peter Swire*
In this book, Professor Mashaw gives a careful account of the Disabil-
ity Insurance (DI) program of the Social Security Administration (SSA).
After discussing what justice can mean in a bureaucratic context,
Mashaw describes three models for making just decisions: bureaucratic
rationality, professional treatment, and moral judgment. Mashaw be-
lieves the bureaucratic rationality model is and should be the dominant
one, and he explores its outlines in a process he calls "searching for the
good within the constraints of the possible."' Mashaw next compares
the recent history of the DI program to this model of bureaucratic ra-"
tionality. He describes this history in terms of the goals of accuracy,'
efficiency, and fairness of disability claims adjudication. For Mashaw,
these goals not only describe the history of the program, but also provide
norms against which to measure proposed changes. He finishes the book
with an argument for implementing an "internal law" of SSA centered
on the general policy of "cautious benevolence." This law would defend
the three norms against the current corruption into objectivity, manage-
ability, and stringency. Such an internal law would eliminate judicial
review of DI cases, and would sharply limit the interference by Congress
with the more managerial system which Mashaw advocates.
The disability program described in the book rivals the size, at least in
number of adjudicators, of the combined judicial systems of the state
and federal governments of the United States.2 Cases begin with deci-
sions by state-employed claims examiners (1,250,000 per year), and pro-
ceed to reconsideration decisions at the state level (250,000 per year).
Further appeal, at the claimant's discretion, leads to de novo hearings
before SSA-employed Administrative Law Judges (ALJs, 150,000 per
year), then to final administrative appeal before the Appeals Council
* J.D.-D.C.L. candidate, Yale Law School. I draw freely in this review on comments
made on a draft form of the book in a seminar in Spring, 1982 led by Professors Mashaw and
Owen Fiss.
1. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 47 (1983).
2. Id. at 18.
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(25,000 per year). Finally, the claimant can appeal to the federal dis-
trict courts (10,000 per year).3 Mashaw has written on judicial review of
SSA action, 4 and has led a study of the ALJ and Appeals Council
levels.5 He now completes his lengthy investigation of the DI program
with this book, which focuses on the initial levels of decisionmaking.
The author's detailed experience with the DI program, combined with a
clear yet subtle theoretical framework, makes the book unusually reada-
ble, believable, and thought-provoking.
A. Bureaucratic Justice
Throughout the book, Mashaw chooses his language painstakingly, 6
and nowhere does this show more than in his central definition of the
"justice of an administrative system," that is, of bureaucratic justice:
"those qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for the ac-
ceptability of its decisions." 7 In parsing this definition, it is helpful to
look at each word and imagine what other terms Mashaw might have
chosen instead. This part of the review examines Mashaw's attempt, in
effect, to define his title, and thereby his book.
The definition employs ordinary English which any reader might use
daily. In fact, throughout the book, Mashaw avoids the temptation to
create Greek- or-Latin-based jargon. This aspect of Mashaw's style not
only communicates well to the reader, but also shows that the writer has
understood his own words. For instance, in expanding upon his defini-
tion of justice, Mashaw names his three models of justice with words
most readers have already encountered: bureaucratic rationality, pro-
fessional treatment, and moral judgment. Each name goes far towards
describing the actors and legitimating values typical of the model. Bu-
reaucrats need a rational decisionmaking process in order to manage
large organizations. Professionals, such as doctors, seek to take care of
their clients' problems; judges try to find ways to fairly resolve value-
conflicts.
These models, in Mashaw's view, compete within SSA. He finds es-
sentially that the bureaucratic rationality model is and should be domi-
nant because it alone can control costs effectively enough to make the
program feasible.8 Mashaw's task then becomes the description and de-
3. Id.
4. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974).
5. J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1978).
6. See MASHAW, supra note 1, at x, and his comments on the multiple "final revisions" of
the text.
7. Id. at 24.




fense of the model as applied to SSA. Bureaucratic rationality, for
Mashaw, follows the idea of bounded rationality developed notably by
March, Simon, and Lindblom. 9 The goal of a just process is "accepta-
bility," not optimality, and in the excellent third chapter Mashaw
guides the reader towards a more "balanced idealism"' 10 which incorpo-
rates the limitations of instrumental rationality. He then demonstrates
his belief in the irreducible "qualities" of good decisionmaking, which
allow sensible talk about the importance of process values while simulta-
neously considering the costs of making decisions accurately, quickly,
and with low administrative costs. "
A striking aspect of the author's definition of justice is the claim that
justice involves "providing arguments" for decisions. Justice, for
Mashaw, has no explicit link to the substance of the decision. The focus
is on the "decision process." Mashaw's concern with "providing argu-
ments" resembles the emphasis on "dialogue" in his former colleague
Bruce Ackerman's Social Justie in the Liberal State. 1 2 The participants in
the two dialogues differ, however. Ackerman investigates the result
when an individual challenges the legitimacy of another individual's
power; Mashaw examines the challenge to t'stt'ut'ons-it is the legiti-
macy of SSA's decisions which must be justified.
The definition of justice leaves one crucial matter unspecified: who
must "provide arguments" to whom in order to legitimate the process?
Mashaw never explicitly answers this question, and this failure consti-
tutes a notable limitation of the book. Without clearly saying so in the
text, Mashaw combines description with prescription in an attempt to
justify SSA to the reader. In adopting the model of bureaucratic ration-
ality, Mashaw takes on the guise of the impartial policy scientist inter-
ested in assuring program implementation. Mashaw imagines himself
an administrator concerned, as the book's subtitle states, with "Manag-
ing Social Security Disability Claims." As I discuss below, this view-
point generates several interesting suggestions for change, but it suffers
from too much discussion of SSA divorced from the context of politics,
the courts, and comparison with other agencies. As Mashaw at one
point observes, SSA increasingly cannot exist in an era of budget cuts as
an entity apart from the political world. 13 In all fairness, Mashaw does
recognize links between SSA and the external world in some instances,
such as the conflicting loyalties of claims examiners both to their own
9. Id. at 51, n.1.
10. Id. at 78.
11. Id. at 79eiseq.
12. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
13. MASHAW, supra note 1, at 19.
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state agency and to SSA.' 4 His managerial focus, however, leaves out
much that a reader concerned with deciding on and achieving change in
SSA would want to know.
B. Judicial Review and the Need for Internal Law
In looking for ways to effect his management changes, Mashaw first
attacks the belief that improvement can result from tighter external con-
trol by the courts. He finds such control, and similar control by Con-
gress, to have been largely "irrelevant" and "impertinent" and suggests
several changes within the program for further study.
Mashaw makes a strong case for the elimination of judicial review of
disability cases. According to Mashaw, judicial review
can recognize the complexity and subtlety of the administrative system
and exercise a restrained review having little or no statistical impact or
precedental significance [irrelevance]; or it can wade in with the tools at its
disposal, producing sometimes unanticipated and negative dynamic effects
on quality, sometimes formal but insubstantial obedience, and sometimes a
simple transformation of administrative into judicial process
[impertinence].15
Mashaw sees this impertinence as having led to a corruption of SSA's
subtle balance of values. Partly as a result of such judicial meddling, the
historical goal of accuracy has turned into objectivity, which fails to al-
low use of the considerable experience of administrators. Efficiency in
the processing of claims has turned into manageability, which empha-
sizes the following of "correct" procedures even when they are inappro-
priate. Finally, fairness has turned into a preoccupation with
stringency, which skews the carefully wrought balance between caution
and benevolence. Together with the Congressional oversight discussed
below, intensive judicial review of SSA claims (10,000 per year), and the
many remands for further development of cases (about a third of those
cases), have forced SSA toward more tamper-proof processes. The result
is what I might call "defensive" claims adjudication, similar to the de-
fensive medicine employed by malpractice-shy doctors. SSA increas-
ingly relies on objective criteria, fostering our worst fears of impersonal
bureaucracies. 16
Convinced of the limited ability of adjudicatory hearings to make ac-
curate, efficient, and fair decisions, Mashaw favors the complete elimi-
nation of both ALJ hearings and judicial review of disability cases. He
14. Id. at 161-63.
15. Id. at 189.
16. Mashaw makes the interesting aside that Kafka worked in a disability administration




makes two types of suggestion for internal reform, both coupled with the
insistence on careful testing characteristic of his systems management
perspective. Mashaw's worry is that "systematic rationality may play
out a progressive logic of control and objectivity that satisfies the Nie-
tzschean definition of the ultimate stupidity-forgetting what it is we
were trying to do.' 7 His answer to that logic of bureaucratic control is
the creation of counterforces in the form of: (a) claimant interviews at
the reconsideration stage, and (b) representation at that stage by gov-
ernment employees similar to the Veterans' Administration claims rep-
resentatives. Testing of the proposal would include careful attention to:
(1) the accuracy of the decisions, that is, the truth or falsity of the claim
to disability; and (2) the claimants' perceptions of the fairness of the
process. These reconsideration decisions apparently would be final, thus
eliminating the delay and expense of the higher levels of appeal.
The SSA administration recommended nationwide interviews at the
reconsideration stage in 1976, but the idea never succeeded in the De-
partment of Health and Human Services. 18 Mashaw has high hopes for
his reconsideration proposals, believing they would improve upon both
the traditional adversary process model and the existing model of bu-
reaucratic rationality.' 9 From his account, the proposals appear plausi-
ble, and should be tested.
The same cannot as easily be said for what Mashaw calls his "more
radical proposals" for internal reform, namely, examination by two or
three doctor panels, and examination by groups of up to six multidis-
ciplinary professionals. In this era of stringency it is difficult to imagine
that even encouraging tests of these proposals would result in change.
Mashaw himself speaks earlier in the book of the strong tendency to-
ward runaway costs that comes with programs dominated by profes-
sional treatment instead of bureaucratic rationality.2 0
In order to help "provide arguments" for his reconsideration or other
similar proposals for internal law, Mashaw concludes the book with a
brief description of a "superbureau" which would fill the symbolic and
functional gap left by the removal of judicial review. 2' The
superbureau would both oversee SSA's implementation of its legislative
mandate, and provide "a symbol of ideal administration" in order to
help us accept the absence of the imposing, black-robed symbolism of
the courts.
17. MASHAW, supra note 1, at 198.
18. Id. at 200.
19. Id. at 202.
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 226-7.
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Even should he come up with some way to make the superbureau
administratively workable, Mashaw would still have to face the grave
political difficulty of forming a centralized, powerful bureau in today's
world of the New Federalism and continuing distrust of "those people in
Washington." Many people of differing political persuasions do not
share Mashaw's faith in his symbol of ideal administration.
In his discussions of the superbureau and the reconsideration propos-
als Mashaw views SSA from an internal perspective. He offers no ac-
count of the politics of changing SSA or other agencies, and he does not
explain how his proposed changes would help meet the needs of impor-
tant external actors, particularly the Congress. Drastic redesign of the
disability claims process and creation of a superbureau would require
strong Congressional backing. But Mashaw does not even mention how
his proposed process would affect the widespread Congressional support
for the program. After all, such support is very likely tied to the ability
of Congress to take credit for the voluminous SSA casework. Nor does
he explore how banishment from the single largest administrative pro-
gram would affect either the status of the other agencies' ALJs or the
status of judicial review of those agencies. It is important to keep in
mind that internal reform seldom remains internal.
C. The Democratic Connection
Mashaw does have afew favorable things to say about Congressional
attempts to reform SSA. He credits the continual oversight of the last
decade with hastening the trend toward effective SSA management, 22
and he praises the controversial "grid regulations '2 3 which have an-
swered Congressional prodding for speedier and more objective claims
examinations (though he does condition this finding upon the need for
SSA to individualize treatment fairly frequently under those regula-
tions). This part of the review argues, however, that he substantially
underrates the continued importance of this democratic connection to
society.
Mashaw has harsh words for recent Congressional initiatives: "[I]n
addition to being insensitive to the complex goals and subtle dynamics
of the disability program, these initiatives may only deflect costs into
different governmental units and into different time periods."'24 In as-
22. Id. at 172-73.
23. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P app. 2 (1982). Cf 43 Fed. Reg. 55349, Nov. 28, 1978.
The grid regulations assess disability quite automatically based on a highly specified grid
marked by age, education, previous work experience, and residual functional capacity.
24. MASHAW, supra note 1, at 224. As an example, he gives a convincing explanation of
how Congressional insistence on high termination rates on Continuing Disability Investiga-
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sessing this remark, the reader must appreciate Mashaw's tendency to
combine positive and normative claims. In his preface, Mashaw men-
tions his hope "to integrate the normative concerns of administrative
law with the positive concerns of organizational theory. '2 5 Mashaw at-
tempts this integration, and the reader must be alert to the implications
of that approach. When Mashaw writes about his preferred goals of
accuracy, efficiency, and fairness, he describes how the SSA system has
historically defined itself. At the same time, he asserts that those three
goals are normatively correct. As external action pushes toward objec-
tivity, manageability, and stringency, Mashaw attempts to document
how the apparent savings are merely shifted to other times or other
agencies. But he also wants the reader to share his vision of a successful,
internal law. For Mashaw, a certain dose of the newer values is impor-
tant, but a SSA freed from constant external control can better make
the sorts of judgment we actually want.
Mashaw would attack the recent Congressional initiatives even if they
turned out, all things considered, to save money. He argues: "[W]e
should be concerned that the system may be becoming too manageable.
A loss of perspective at the top might rather too quickly reshape exam-
iner behavior. The value complexity that results from an internal com-
petition among visions of justice might be in danger of being lost." '26
Even a burning Congressional desire and ability to save money does not
answer such criticism. Mashaw here moves beyond mere description.
Accuracy-the telling of true from false claims (and whose "truth" is
applied?)-becomes an ideal to strive for, even against explicit Congres-
sional urgings of stringency.
Mashaw loses a good deal of his persuasiveness when he continues
past his careful description of the system into this normative realm. The
internal law of SSA that Mashaw proposes would lack any tie to the
familiar democratic symbols of legitimacy. Further, that internal law
would lack any effective check on its power. Mashaw has a lot more
talking to do before he can convince me to abandon so completely our
tradition of checks and balances.
It is important to see that the Congress Mashaw would limit has actu-
ally been quite effective in its oversight of SSA. Oversight by the Sub-
committee on Social Security of the House Ways and Means Committee
tions has resulted in higher eventual costs for both state and federal agencies. In addition, he
questions the Quality Assurance Program policy of stricter review of grants than of denials,
Id. at 174, and he deplores the danger of the overbureaucratization that would result from
too mechanical an application of the grid regulations, Id. at 179.
25. Id. at ix.
26. Id. at 221.
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has been intense. Individual Congressional staffs have developed con-
siderable knowledge of the agency through their constant DI program
casework. By Mashaw's own account, Congress has forced many of the
improvements in management of the last decade.
Limiting this Congressional oversight runs the risk of fraying too
much the democratic connection of SSA to the rest of society. The surge
of social welfare programs which peaked during Johnson's Great Society
led to the birth and growth of the DI program. The past decade has
seen a substantial retrenchment of such programs. The current empha-
sis on stringency may be part of a long-term change in societal attitudes
toward the DI program. Even if Mashaw could assure us of adequate
internal checks on the arbitrary use of power, and of the impertinence of
current Congressional oversight, he would still face a difficult task. To
create his brand of internal law he would still have to convince us that
Congress should not attempt to legislate even the broad swings in SSA
policy. Congress sets the budget, and Congress is the only connection
left (assuming the cut-off of judicial review) to the changing views of
non-SSA actors. If Congress wants stringency, it will require more of an
argument than Mashaw has provided to show us why SSA should in-
stead pursue accuracy.
D. Conclusion
The criticisms made above should not divert the reader's attention
from the many virtues of the book. Mashaw shows a great sensitivity to
the difficulties of balancing competing world views, and their accompa-
nying values, within a bureaucracy sharply constrained by costs. He
familiarizes the reader with the practical workings and theoretical chal-
lenges of a dauntingly complex system, and does so without lapsing into
jargon or needless details.
Earlier, I asked the question: "Who must provide arguments to whom
in order to legitimate the process?" In adopting the perspective of an
SSA administrator, Mashaw himself attempts to legitimate the process,
with which he is in broad accord, to each reader.
Who ought those readers be? I can imagine several audiences who
would benefit from the book. The clear language makes the book suit-
able for an undergraduate class. At the same time, Mashaw maintains a
sophistication which will well serve professional students of subjects such
as administrative law, political science, and the sociology of large orga-
nizations. The book sensitively traces for people within SSA the com-
peting tendencies toward accuracy and stringency which increasingly




cluding members of Congress and their staffs, of the difficulty yet possi-
bility of achieving pertinent democratic oversight of the massive DI
program. While the program may not fulfill Mashaw's hope of creating
an ideal symbol of administration, the book goes far toward showing the
reader how well SSA has indeed managed its difficult task of searching
for the good within the constraints of the possible.
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JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?. By Jerold S. Auerbach New York.- Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1983. Pp. xii, 182.
Paul M. Schwartz*
Jerold S. Auerbach does not like the law and distrusts lawyers, a pair
of prejudices not unknown to our society and not entirely debilitating
for the student of alternative methods of dispute settlement. In the pref-
ace toJustce Without Law? the law is dismissed as being more likely to
sustain domination than to equalize power.' It is also characterized as
threatening, inaccessible, and exorbitant for the least powerful members
of society.2 As for lawyers, they tend to reinforce legal norms, thus
blocking any effort to escape the law's tortuous proceedings. 3 And while
lawyers practice a profession that is "astonishing" in its attractiveness as
a career choice, 4 they themselves turn out to be technicians for whom
justice inheres in form and process rather than "substantive content."'5
A final characteristic of lawyers is the tenacity with which they resist the
implementation of any new form of dispute settlement until they are
assured a role in the revised system.6
Despite the drawbacks to law and the limitations of lawyers, Justice
Without Law? finds legal piety to be paramount in America. Law is our
national religion; lawyers are our priesthood; the courtroom is our ca-
thedral; and the analogy is concluded with a final turn of the screw: "In
the twentieth century it is justice, the secular equivalent of salvation,
that is sold for a fee."' 7 Though Auerbach occasionally seems petty or
personally motivated in his animosity towards lawyers and the law,8 his
most basic premise is valid: our culture is so thoroughly linked to its
legal institutions that we may have trouble imagining any other possible
organization.9 The goal of Just ice Without Law? is to discover whether
any system other than the present one can handle our society's disputes.
* J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1985.
I. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? (1983).
2. Id. at vi.
3. Id. at 111.
4. Id. at 115.
5. Id. at 143.
6. Id. at 109.
7. Id. at 9.
8. In a parenthesis to a footnote Auerbach notes the legal training of the historian Daniel
J. Boorstin in order to cast aspersions on Boorstin's negative evaluation of the Quaker's use of
alternative dispute settlement. Id. at 151, n.15. In the last footnote to his book, Auerbach
goes on to attack law school, his encounter with which he terms "Kafkaesque" and "a form of
trial, by ordeal." Id. at 175, n.3.




Auerbach begins by arguing that various methods of non-legal dis-
pute settlement have been utilized successfully at different moments in
American history.' 0 He identifies the first such use as coming during the
colonial period. Unfortunately, this experience with non-legal forms,
while beneficial for each settlement involved, reveals itself to be inappo-
site for modern America. Our nation's roots are in the colonial era, but
the current structure of our society belies its origin.
During the colonial era disputes were channeled into various institu-
tions, many of which were removed from the reach of courts and law-
yers. The Puritans of New England relied on a framework of communal
dispute settlement made possible by their shared religious values. In
this system, civil and religious authority were somewhat fused, and each
church acted as a court for a wide variety of disputes, including not
merely religious offenses but also commercial and property disputes."'
While church proceedings differed throughout the Puritan's domain,
typically the entire congregation participated in the reaching of a deci-
sion. This decision was enforced only by the sanctions of admonition
and excommunication, but Auerbach considers these to have been ade-
quate because church and community were virtually congruent for the
Puritan and because the danger of expulsion was real.' 2
Quakers resolved their disputes according to a procedure called the
"Gospel Order," which was based on the New Testament.' 3 If an indi-
vidual attempt at persuasion of the other party to a dispute failed and if
one or two other Quakers were unable to resolve the difference, the
problem was arbitrated by impartial Quakers. In the case of a total
refusal to accept arbitration, the monthly meeting of Friends could ex-
pel the stubborn troublemaker."4
Arbitration was relied on by settlers tied together by bonds other than
religion. In their ethnic enclave of New Netherland the Dutch estab-
lished a nine man board of arbitration, comprised of elites alone, which
resolved disputes whenever possible without recourse to the courts.15 In
1768 New York merchants, a community defined by a shared interest in
trade, established America's first private tribunal for the extra-judicial
settlement of commercial disputes. ' 6 Finally, communal land allocation
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 21-22.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 29. The Gospel Order was based on Matthew XVIlI: 15-20.
14. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 30.
15. Id. at 31.
16. Id. at 33.
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in Sudbury, Massachusetts expressed a commitment to the cooperative
principles of English open-field farming which seems to have carried
over to this region's decision to resolve disputes through discussion
rather than adjudication.' 7
Auerbach's survey of non-legal dispute settlement in colonial America
indicates a historically-based countertradition to legalism in our coun-
try. Yet the colonial alternatives also serve to make the modern rule of
law seem more rather than less attractive.
The colonial reliance on arbitration is illuminated by the discussion in
Justice Without Law? of Mrs. Hibbens, the refractory wife of a prominent
Bostonian. 8 In 1640 Mrs. Hibbens objected to both the initial fee a
carpenter charged her for work and the revised fee set by a pair of arbi-
trators. The influence of church elders could not convince her to accept
the revised fee, and when a second arbitration attempt failed the dispute
moved into the First Church of Boston. Here the discussion centered
not on the appropriate amount due to the carpenter, but on the refusal
of Mrs. Hibbens to respect the community and Christ. After two meet-
ings in the church, held five months apart, a decision was made in favor
of full excommunication.
The treatment of Mrs. Hibbens is not very convincing proof of the
value of the Puritan method of dispute settlement. From a modern per-
spective the shortcomings of this system are the harshness and unfitness
of the penalty imposed and the institutional rigidity caused by a limited
range of sanctions. Indeed the full story is worse than first appears.
Such is his zeal for the colonial use of consensual decision-making that
Auerbach neglects to tell the ultimate fate of Mrs. Hibbens: two years
after the death of her politically influential husband, in 1656, Mrs. Hib-
bens was indicted and convicted of the charge of witchcraft. This time
the alternative method of dispute settlement decided on a sentence of
death. 19
Even if we suspend any lurking twentieth century biases and admit
the merit of the colonial system for those able to benefit from it, this
option remains unsuitable for present-day America. Auerbach admits
as much. The colonial societies he surveys opposed conflict or indivi-
dual deviance because these were forces which might threaten a settle-
ment.20 Hence, Mrs. Hibbens' greatest fault was not her refusal to
honor a debt but the way her individual, adversarial attitude was out of
17. Id. at 26.
18. See id. at 23-24. Auerbach's source is JOHN DEMOS, REMARKABLE PROVIDENCES:
1600-1760, 221-239 (1972).
19. DEMOS, supra note 18, at 221.




place in a society based on communal values. 2 ' In our society, individ-
ual rights and individual pursuit of wealth are enthroned; and perhaps
the most valuable point ofJustice Without Law? is that community-cen-
tered arbitration and consensually-derived justice have an inherently
uneasy place in such a world. Lawyers, although a tempting target for
blame, are the creatures and not the creators of an order which uses
litigation to insure a degree of stability amid what Auerbach has else-
where termed, "the expansive freedom to compete, acquire, retain and
bequeath. ' '22
In a sense then arbitration was an easy choice for colonial societies
because they were able to rely on a set of shared values missing today.
Even New York merchants shared a sense of purpose two and a half
centuries ago! Having overestimated the difficulty of the colonial
choice, Auerbach goes on to misunderstand the nature of the present
reliance on law. He confuses law with litigation.
Since law is said to begin only where the community ends, justice is
only possible without law when there is congruence between individuals
and their community.2 3 Yet even in a community where all values are
shared, a community where the meaning of justice is clear, there would
be a need to use law-the systematic exercise of power to protect the
most important values of society. The way Mrs. Hibbens ruffled Puri-
tan feathers proves that the meaning of justice is never clear enough to
every member of a community to make law unnecessary. So all commu-
nities are eventually forced to use law-if not litigation. Colonial cul-
tures rejected formal adjudication or tried to limit it, but they did use
arbitration and other devices to enforce their most cherished values. We
rely on a law that depends upon litigation and we have discovered its
limitation.
II
Justice Without Litigation? is a more precise title for Auerbach's book.
For litigation is what he confuses with law. And litigation is what he
deems a less than satisfactory device because of his idealistic yearning
for an America which cares more for community strength than for indi-
vidual advantage.2 4 Yet the crowning irony of his book is his final advo-
cacy of litigation as the best system now available. This acceptance of
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22. AUERBACH, Burger's Golden Ca/f, New Republic, 9 (March 3, 1982).
23. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 16.
24. Id. at 139.
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formal adjudication is caused by the way alternative dispute settlement
is currently institutionalized.
To understand the way alternative dispute settlement is employed, we
must first perceive the causes of litigation's disfavor. A major source of
this dissatisfaction is the fantastic growth of lawsuits before state and
Federal courts. 25 Civil case filings in Federal courts alone have in-
creased fivefold between 1940 and 1981.26 This "avalanche" of lawsuits
has led Warren Burger, no utopian himself, to agree with Auerbach in
general belief that the adversarial procedure of our legal system is ex-
pensive, time-consuming, and tends to leave "a trail of stress and frustra-
tions."'27 For the Chief Justice the fitting solution to these shortcomings
is a supplementation of the present system by employment of arbitra-
tion, mediation, and conciliation. 28 In addition to the need for institu-
tional efficiency, the new popularity of alternative dispute settlement is
helped by conservative opposition to judicial activism. 29 It is no acci-
dent, claims Auerbach, that alternative dispute settlement is most en-
thusiastically prescribed for the disadvantaged citizens who have started
to use litigation to guard and extend their rights.30 By diverting griev-
ances from the courts, the forum which can most powerfully redress
them, informal proceedings lead to reduced chances for legal adjust-
ments for those citizens who most need legal rights and remedies-the
citizens disadvantaged by race, class, and national origin. 3' The lamen-
table result of alternative dispute settlement forces Auerbach to advo-
cate a traditional system of litigation.
At this point,Justice Without Law? rewards the diligent reader with a
designation of the sphere in which litigation serves a useful purpose.
When a dispute occurs among unequal strangers a court, by extending
the formality of equal protection to the weaker party, can rectify this
imbalance. 32 By warning against "the seductive appeal of alternative
institutions,"33Justice Without Law? sounds an unexpected note, which is
then extended by a caution that "alternatives prevent the use of courts
for redistributive purposes in the interest of equality, by consigning the
rights of disadvantaged citizens to institutions with minimal power to
25. Id. at 122.
26. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1982, § A, at 19, col. 1.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 121.
30. Id. at 124.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id. at 144.
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enforce or protect them."'3 4
It is an all or nothing proposition Auerbach leaves us with. In the
absence of a new vision of community, we are better off with litigation
than a shabby alternative system that combines the worst features of
legality and informality and that limits a day in court to those able to
afford it. Auerbach fears nothing short of an abdication of responsibil-
ity: "Legal institutions may not provide equal justice under law, but in
a society ruled by law it is their responsibility. '3 5 The search for ways to
improve our legal institutions will continue and should continue; the
contribution ofJustce Without Law. to the search is its gloomy warning
that we may end worse off than before. Alternative dispute settlement
all too easily becomes a trick performed to the detriment of the
disadvantaged.
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